While human ..motions are often considered instinctive, this paper examines the notion that indifference to events or circumstances which might seem to have a prima facie claim to emotional significance is related to the narrative construction of those events or circumstances in the life of the observer, and is not a result of absolute stimulus value or of inner biological events. Also, indifference is selective in the same person. Caring is invested in some objects and utterly withheld from others; this selective investment of caring is intelligible only from a narrative point of view. Finally, the range and character of indifferent events and objects varies dramatically from person to person in a way that is csr.sistent with a person's constructed identity and the relation of that identity to the world. Since moral judgments about actions are a direct function of selective indifference, it follows that systems of morality are selective and partial as well. The moral quality of objects, and hence their emotional significance, inheres not in the objects but in the way those objects are described by the selective moralist. Enormous individual differences exist in the capacity to maintain a wide range of conscious and moral interest in the world. Examples are cited that are consistent with the proposition that emotional reactivity and the lack of it--indifference--are dependent upon the connections between individuals and their -;rcumstances created by their narrative constructions. Psychology is coming to understand that human life cannot be understood at all without the premise that humans are as much biographical creatures as they are biological ones. Contains nine references. (BF) 
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Neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands.
--William James2
These lines are taken from the concluding section of James' essay, "On a certain blindness in human beings." The essay is a compilation of cases illustrating the enormous differences from Our capacity to story ourselves and the world about us removes our indifference, in part, but only in small part--for I claim that our normal condition is to be indifferent to life and death, save our own life and death and then secondarily to the lives and deaths of such other creatures, real and imagined, as come to be connected to us or presented to us in our made worlds.
We are not indifferent to objects in our own narrative worlds, even though those objects are made up. The tears in the theater at the deaths of the wives of Forrest Gump or of C.S. Lewis are as real as any others. Art pulls us away from the indifference of nature into our fretful humanity, and there we cry, we laugh, we blush. All art is propaganda, as Orwell has said, and the function of propaganda is to make us care passionately about that to which we were formerly indifferent.
We live in circles of meaning, circles created by our own life histories; our formal and informal connections to others begin, endure for awhile, and are often forgotten--then passing 3 out of the circles of meaning and into the void of indifference.
We read of the death of a childhood chum--someone once close but now long out of the circles of our active life--and accord it notice, but little feeling. If you want a person to care about something--say the war in Bosnia, the victimization of women, the pestilence in Rwanda, the doleful consequences of crack addiction, the deadly consequence of easy access to guns--you must bring these events vividly into a person's circle of meaning by words and pictures--dramatically composed and frequently repeated.
Consciousness is naturally lazy and retreats easily into indifference; consciousness raising removes indifference, if only for awhile.
Enormous individual differences exist in the capacity to maintain a wide range of conscious and moral interest in the world.
Wordsworth roams nature and invests each object with moral life. Thoreau is inspired and alive at Walden Pond, not bored and withdrawn. Whitman exults where other men snore.
Listen to Emerson:
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear.
(from James, 1900, p, 257) Similarly, Carl Jung (1965) talks to his pots and pans and cannot shake his animistic visions. Annie Dillard (1982) , in our time, takes seriously the task of teaching a stone to talk--and 4 she says, after prolonged and assiduous observation, "Nature's silence is its one remark" (p. 69).
At the other extreme, I can describe a case deserving the clinical label, alexithymia--a term applied to patients who have marked difficulty in verbal expression of emotions and a limited capacity for fantasy. Let me call him Alex.
Alex is the 18-year-old son of a divorced couple--the father is a pilot and the mother, a practical nurse. He has one older
sister.
Alex has a tested IQ of about 120, but was consistently an indifferent student. He has no friends, no interest in sports, no hobbies, no apparent sexual interests or activities.
He does not help with household chores. He is passive, not actively rebellious. He doesn't break things nor fix them. When he reached age 16, he began to stay home from school, often sleeping until mid-afternoon. He lives with his mother, who has brain cancer, and his older sister, who is actively rebellious, often sneaks cut of the house at night, and has a strong interest in boys.
The mother has tried to force Alex to go to school, but he refuses. She has taken him to school, dropped him off at the door, only to have him walk home. She has resorted to locking him out of the house, but he simply stays all day in the garage.
She removed the television set and VCR from his room, but since this punishment produced no apparent consequences, she eventually gave in and restored them.
At age 17, Alex was sent off to a military academy. For awhile he seemed to be adapting well to the structure of the 5 place.
However, within six weeks of his arrival he was dismissed for two instances of petty theft and was returned home, where he resumed his residence in his room. Indeed, he did complete a GED program, to which he was ferried on a weekly basis by his father. When it is pointed out that his passivity and lack of cooperation creates difficulties for his sick mother (the case in point was his refusal to shovel show to clear the driveway, forcing his cancer-ridden mother to this chore), he simply said that he didn't care. In fact, the response, "I don't care," is Alex's most frequent locution, and proved to be as exasperatingly unanswerable as Melville's "Bartleby, the scrivener," who used the similar phrase, "I would Despite his mother's repeated threats to throw him out of the house, and several attempts in this direction, he always wanders back home, and she, out of pity, takes him in again.
While Alex is an extreme case among human beings, perhaps in another sense his attitude toward life is a natural one, amoral as it is. Annie Dillard has this to say about emotions in nature:
It is our emotions that are amiss. We are freaks, the world is fine, and let us all go have lobotomies to restore us to a natural state. We can leave the library then, go back to the creek lobotomized, and live on its bank as untroubled as any muskrat or reed. human identity are determined (dramatistically, cf, Sarbin, 1994) by culturally inherited forms, stories, narratives, and roles.
In the mid-19th century, modern nationalism and racial ideologies, as well as the growth of the bureaucratic ethic, emerged as a major shapers of identities. The sequel is that the limits of indifference and strong emotional investment are redrawn to correspond to national and racial groupings. The bureaucrat is entitled to restrict caring and to become indifferent in a wholly new and expansive way.
As our stories are shaped, so are our patterns of caring and
indifference. This in turn determines the selectivity of our morality-whom and whr,t we strive to save, and whom and what we are content to let perish. I have argued that indifference is a natural condition--that none can escape it. But our human capacity to produce and live in a narrative world gives us the capacity to escape from the indifference of the anthill, beehive, or flock. These structures are efficient--much more efficient than our own, where emotional squeamishness keeps us from eating our own dead. But they are unlike the human socius in the crucial respect of not producing our pecular forms of passionate caring.
Psychology is coming to understand that human life cannot be understood at all without the premise that we are as much biographical creatures as we are biological ones. Biography is story, is narrative, is a construction--and it produces feeling in its train, in exchange for natural indifference. We are obliged to understand this.
